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Abstract
Violence against women (VAW) in India is commonly attributed to an overarching 
metacultural patriarchal framework. Focusing on this national culture of violence 
obscures the experiences of VAW among ethnic minority women. This article focuses 
on VAW in Northeast India, a region populated by large numbers of Scheduled Tribes 
with different cultural norms, and where society has become militarized by ongoing 
insurgency and counterinsurgency. Though tempting, militarization alone is not a 
sufficient explanation for VAW; instead, this article focuses on the interplay between 
nonfamilial and familial contexts in creating a “frontier culture of violence” in which 
VAW is experienced and contested.
Keywords
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Introduction
Violence against women (VAW) in India has been analyzed through a range of disci-
plines and in a range of different sociocultural spaces. The relationship between these 
spaces is mostly hierarchical. Studies focusing on localized manifestations of VAW are 
related back to an overarching metacultural patriarchal framework. In other words, VAW 
in India may have local manifestations, but these are variations of a national patriarchy 
reproduced by a singularized “Indian culture.” Despite recognition of rapid changes in 
Article
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“Indian culture” the patriarchal elements remain stubborn. Although this may offer some 
useful insights into the persistence of VAW in India, this framework is limited in analyz-
ing the experiences of VAW among women from ethnic minority groups within India, 
particularly those living in very different cultural, social, economic, and political con-
texts. This article is concerned with VAW in the Northeast states of India, particularly in 
the so-called hill states occupying the eastern frontier of India. The Northeast poses a 
complex conundrum. Most of the factors used to explain the causes of VAW in other 
parts of India, such as rigid religious norms, dowry, dependency in marriage, and caste-
based inequality, do not apply to the majority of women in the Northeast. Most of the 
factors identified as reducing the risks of VAW, such as high female education and lit-
eracy rates, paid employment, and autonomous decision making, are prevalent. Yet 
levels of VAW are very high, among the highest in India when spousal and nonspousal 
violence are included.
This article contends that essentialist notions of gender oppression are inadequate in 
understanding the realities in the Northeast frontier. An intersectional framework is 
adopted to illuminate the ways in which patriarchies are intertwined with militarization, 
and the categories of race, ethnicity, tribe, exceptionalism, and suspect populations to 
produce a “frontier culture of violence.” This is explored through three stages reflecting 
the three components of the overall argument. The first stage establishes the components 
of the “national culture of violence” discussed in literature on VAW in India by review-
ing the most frequently occurring explanations for VAW in India: religious norms, dowry, 
dependency in marriage, and caste-based inequality. These factors are largely absent 
from society in the Northeast, yet levels of VAW are high, inviting a closer analysis of 
the contexts within which VAW is experienced, termed here the frontier culture of vio-
lence. The second stage examines the frontier culture of violence by focusing on the 
external nonfamilial context and the internal familial context in which VAW takes place. 
The external nonfamilial context of VAW emanates from the occupation of the region by 
the Indian Armed Forces and the proliferation of militant groups causing direct and indi-
rect VAW. While tempting to attribute familial VAW solely to the militarization of soci-
ety in the Northeast, this article eschews a simple causal link and focuses instead on the 
interplay between the external and internal contexts, allowing for degrees of influence 
between the two and also for the influence of other factors. The third stage shifts from 
the experience of VAW to its contestation by women’s movements in the region. It is 
argued that the external nonfamilial context of VAW is able to be contested with less dif-
ficulty than the internal familial context. Contestation of VAW perpetrated by the armed 
forces converges with a broader discourse in civil society, whereas contestation of VAW 
within the household and among members of ethnic minority communities is more dif-
ficult to contest and gains far less popular support. The article concludes by discussing 
the need to look beyond national cultures of violence to analyze the particular configura-
tions of factors in frontier and border areas that enact and enable VAW.
This research is the result of fieldwork in Northeast India in 2005, 2008, and 2009. 
During these visits interviews, informal discussions, and observations of women’s orga-
nizations and movements allowed a picture of VAW and its contestation to emerge. 
 at UNSW Library on September 15, 2014vaw.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
324  Violence Against Women 18(3) 
Although primary interview data have helped shape the material in this article, the sensi-
tive nature of the material has prevented the direct quotation of respondents; instead, it 
draws on secondary data available through national and state government reports, publi-
cations by women’s organizations, human rights organizations, and existing literature. 
This article uses the concept of intersectionality to focus on the ways different categories 
of gender, race, ethnicity, tribe, exceptionalism, and suspect populations converge in the 
context of the militarized Northeast. The origin of the term intersectionality is traced to 
Crenshaw (1991), who saw the concept as a way to complicate the tendency of identity 
politics to ignore and homogenize intragroup difference. Crenshaw found this particu-
larly problematic when analyzing VAW, which she argued was “often shaped by other 
dimensions of . . . identities, such as race and class,” not only does this obscure the 
causes and experiences of VAW but also it makes the politicization of violence more dif-
ficult (p. 1242). Initially, the concept was used to examine the intersections of race, class, 
and gender, and generate a feminist praxis to challenge oppressive structures faced by 
women, particularly Black women in the United States (Jordan-Zachery, 2007). In recent 
years, the concept has broadened to account for the intersection of “multiple axes of dif-
ferentiation” (Brah & Phoenix, 2004, p. 76), which can create “hierarchies of differential 
access to a variety of resources—economic, political and cultural” (Yuval-Davis, 2006, 
p. 199). It is important to identify the conflation between intersecting categories and their 
relational dynamics. As McClintock (1995) argues in the context of empire building, 
“race, gender and class are not distinct realms of experience, existing in splendid isola-
tion from each other; nor can they be simply yoked together retrospectively like arma-
tures of Lego . . . they come into existence in and through each other—if in contradictory 
and conflictual ways” (p. 5).
In this article, intersectionality is used as a method of inquiry into the ways VAW is 
experienced, accepted publically and privately, and politicized in Northeast India. I 
argue that the intersection of “axes of differentiation” is particular to this region and 
creates conditions that are not experienced in other parts of India, though frequently the 
experiences of other parts of India are used to understand the Northeast. Although this 
may seem to be a logical application of intersectionality, often in the literature race is 
conceptualized in broad categories such as South Asian or Indian, or in religious/cul-
tural categories such as “Indian Hindu.” This ignores the ways race operates for mem-
bers of ethnic minorities, whose social positioning is relational to dominant ethnic 
groups and other minority communities in their own localized context, as will be evi-
dent below.
This article will use the term Northeast to refer to all eight states of the Northeast 
region of India, namely, Arunachal Pradesh, Asom, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, 
Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. At certain points, the descriptor “hill states” will be 
used to refer only to the five states with majority “tribal” populations.1 The term tribal 
refers to ethnic groups designated as Scheduled Tribes in the Indian Constitution. In 
the Northeast, most of these groups trace their ethnic lineage to Tibeto-Burman and 
Mon-Khmer people in Southeast Asia and Tibet, marking a distinct cultural difference 
to the myriad of people in other parts of India. The term tribal will be used in this 
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article to designate these ethnic groups as it is the term commonly used in India and 
internalized by most of the people subject to the term. The term ethno-nationalism will 
be used to denote the political and social discourses that dominate the region. Ethno-
nationalism captures the essence of the full range of collective agency that has charac-
terized the region in the last five decades, virtually all based on the political 
accommodation of ethnic and tribal differences. The concept of the Indian “mainland” 
is common in the Northeast to refer to the rest of India and accentuate the cultural, 
political, and social differences between the Northeast frontier and the Indian heart-
land. While classifying the Indian mainland in the singular overlooks major cultural 
differences within, particularly between south India and Gangetic north India,2 it better 
reflects the core separation between the Northeast and the mainland. This will be 
explained further in the following section.
The National Culture of Violence
Data on VAW in India vary according to the different scales, methods, and definitions 
adopted in collecting the data. This can result in very different results. For example, the 
National Family and Health Survey, the primary source of comprehensive data on VAW 
in India produced by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MHFW), changed the 
way it defines VAW between its 2002 survey and its 2009 survey (MHFW, 2009, p. 467). 
In 2002, women were asked if they were “beaten or physically mistreated since the age 
of 15” and, if so, they were asked about the perpetrator (MHFW, 2002, p. 74). This did 
not limit results to familial violence only. In 2009, the definition of violence was 
expanded to include “emotional violence,” “sexual violence,” and “physical violence” 
(MHFW, 2009, pp. 494-495), yet the spatial context was limited to familial violence 
defined as “violence by spouses as well as by other household members” (MHFW, 2009, 
p. 494). The overall findings are thus very discordant; the national average for the 2002 
survey showed 21.0% of women in India experiencing “beatings or physical mistreat-
ment” (MHFW, 2002, p. 79), whereas the 2009 survey showed 39.7% of “ever-married” 
women experiencing “emotional or physical or sexual violence” (MHFW, 2009, p. 519), 
which was lowered to 35.4% when “never-married” women were included (MHFW, 
2009, p. 504). This difference is the key to analyzing VAW in the Northeast as will be 
seen below. Regardless of these and other variations, and regardless of the likelihood 
that all statistics on VAW are underestimates given the reluctance many women to report 
VAW to researchers (not to mention authorities), VAW in India is widespread. This has 
produced a growing number of studies that seek to identify the causes of VAW and 
explain its prevalence.
Literature on VAW in India has focused on spousal violence and familial violence, 
with some attention to political and communal violence. The causes of VAW are explained 
as deeply rooted in the ways gender is constructed, reproduced, institutionalized, and 
internalized in Indian society, a metacultural patriarchy. VAW is attributed to national 
cultural norms replayed throughout Indian society. There are four main components to 
this that are closely linked and will be discussed briefly in turn.
 at UNSW Library on September 15, 2014vaw.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
326  Violence Against Women 18(3) 
The first is patriarchy derived from religious norms. As Panchanadeswaran and 
Koverola (2005) write, VAW “needs to be placed in the patriarchal, patrilineal, and 
patrilocal . . . cultural context of India marked by unequal gender relations that are rooted 
in centuries old religious scriptures” (p. 737). The idea that VAW in India is “age-old” is 
common (Kaur & Garg, 2008; Sharma, 2005). Authors link this to religious traditions, 
mostly Hindu. Expectations of chaste and faithful wives, of men being akin to God as 
husbands and to saviors as sons (Rastogi & Therly, 2006), and of the honor gained by 
kanyadaan, the offering of daughters to another family (Panchanadeswaran & Koverola, 
2005), are seen as deeply rooted norms that reinforce patriarchy and provide the socio-
cultural conditions in which VAW occurs. Such norms are evident across social, political, 
and economic life and are institutionalized in the law, the government, and the household 
(Ahmed-Ghosh, 2004). In the VAW literature, this national patriarchy has deeply embed-
ded notions of male ownership over women’s bodies, sexuality, labor, reproductive 
rights, and autonomy (Sharma, 2005). Thus, women in India only gain power and social 
acceptance through their participation in patriarchy as daughters, wives, and mothers. 
This transcends caste, social class, and social mobility. Besides the essentialist nature of 
much of this literature, there is little detailed discussion of communities practicing 
minority religions in the VAW literature. There are exceptions, but these are mostly in 
other literatures on communal violence and social change (Basu, 1998; Chhachhi, 1991; 
Subramaniam, 2006). If minority religions are included, the focus is usually on Islam and 
this is rarely seen to disrupt the metacultural patriarchy; rather it merges with it. As 
Ahmed-Ghosh (2004) points out, “although Hindu precepts do not apply to Muslims in 
India, a combination of Islamic laws and Hindu cultural edicts bring about similar dis-
criminations for Muslim women in India” (p. 117n).
The second component is dowry. Dowry is seen as the main structure through which 
VAW is perpetrated (Kelkar, 1985; Menski, 1998; Rastogi & Therly, 2006; van Willigen 
& Channa, 1991). Dowry refers to the wealth a woman brings to her husband’s family, and 
it is generally negotiated between the parents of the couple. As Bloch and Rao (2002) 
point out, it is the ongoing demands and expectations of further payments demanded by 
the husband and his family throughout the early stages of marriage that lead to violence. 
The expectations and aspirations associated with dowry are increasing during heightened 
demand for consumer lifestyles in India (Oldenburg, 2002), recently termed dowry infla-
tion (Arunachalam & Logan, 2008). Despite a 1961 law making dowry illegal it is still 
widely practiced (Rastogi & Therly, 2006), and it has been adopted by some communities 
who did not previously practice it (Uberoi, 1994). The nonfulfillment of dowry is a major 
catalyst in VAW, perpetrated by husbands and by members of his family, including other 
women in the patrilocal household. This has led to conclusions that VAW is far more 
likely in joint households than in nuclear families (Kaur & Garg, 2009; Panchanadeswaran 
& Koverola, 2005). Findings suggest that demands for dowry result in VAW from both 
wealthy families, as they are subjected to higher expectations and the assumption of ongo-
ing capacity to fulfill dowry demands (Bloch & Rao, 2002), and from poorer families, as 
they find it extremely difficult to meet dowry demands (Srinivasan & Bedi, 2007). 
However, as Shenk (2007) argues, much of what is attributed to dowry violence in 
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contemporary India may not be related to dowry at all. Dowry is almost completely absent 
among the tribal communities of the Northeast.
The third component is dependency in marriage. Marriage in India is virtually univer-
sal, and for women, it usually takes place once in their lifetime (MHFW, Kishor, & Gupta, 
2009). Divorce carries a major social stigma for women and their families, and thus, 
women are more likely to remain in abusive marriages, less likely to seek help, and more 
likely to tolerate abuse (Basu, 2001). Often women who seek support with their natal fam-
ily find that their parents are anxious to return them to their husbands lest they bring 
shame on the family and ruin other siblings’ marriage prospects (Panchanadeswaran & 
Koverola, 2005). Many women are aware of this and do not want to place financial and 
social burdens on their parents and siblings. Furthermore, many women are highly eco-
nomically dependent on their husbands making it difficult for them to leave abusive mar-
riages (Schuler, Bates, & Islam, 2008). Much of this fear is the product of “economic 
abuse” derived from patriarchy, which prohibits many women working outside the home 
or allows husbands to control their wife’s earnings when they do work (Vyas, 2006). Few 
women have property rights (Karanjawala & Chugh, 2009), yet in cases where they do, 
experiences of VAW are lower (Panda & Agarwal, 2005). Although attitudes toward mar-
riage are similar in the Northeast, women’s relative economic empowerment, the preva-
lence of nuclear families, and greater access to property rights (among some ethnic 
groups), reduce economic dependency.
The fourth component is caste-based inequality and gendered poverty more broadly. 
This is not discussed with the same frequency as the above components, though it is 
becoming more popular (Menon, 2009; Srivastava, 2002). Inequality and poverty are 
seen as a cause of VAW and as a symptom (Krishnan, 2005). Stratification, particularly 
caste, is seen to affect VAW by creating and/or intensifying the household conditions and 
broader social conditions in which VAW occurs (Kapadia, 2002). Often the findings 
reveal that poorer and lower caste women experience higher levels of VAW, particularly 
as they experience the repercussions of discrimination and exploitation directly and 
when experienced by their husbands, much of which is related to high levels of debt, 
exploitative work conditions, and alcohol abuse (Krishnan, 2005). Yet, as Krishnan 
(2005) points out, upper-caste women and women from wealthier backgrounds may be 
less likely to admit to experiencing violence. Furthermore, lower educational and liter-
acy levels among women generally, and particularly women from lower castes, can 
translate into a high level of dependency on husbands, a greater reluctance to seek help 
when VAW occurs, and a decreased awareness of rights and laws (Kaur & Garg, 2009). 
The National Health and Family Survey data provide a strong correlation between liter-
acy and higher education levels and a decreased likelihood of VAW (MHFW, 2009). 
Although communities in the Northeast are not free from inequalities, caste-based strati-
fication and marginalization are not practiced by tribal communities in the hill states and 
are far less rigid among the plains communities.
Although other components are discussed in the literature, including exposure to 
VAW in childhood (Martin et al., 2002), the discord between national laws and cultural 
practices (Karanjawala & Chugh, 2009), and the backlash against women’s reservations 
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in political institutions (Mayaram, 2002), they are invoked far less frequently than the 
four components discussed above. These components constitute a national culture of 
violence transcending local variations and creating a pervasive culture in which VAW is 
widespread and normalized. However, in the Northeast, particularly in the five hill states 
populated by tribal ethnic minorities, people adhere to divergent religious traditions and 
cultural practices, and women have some of the highest educational and gender empow-
erment indicators in the country. Yet VAW is very high and, in many of these states, well 
above the Indian national average. What explains such high levels of VAW?
The Frontier Exception
The Northeast refers to the area of land between Bhutan, China, Myanmar, and 
Bangladesh. It is almost completely cut off from the rest of India, joined only by a nar-
row corridor of land between the borders of Nepal and Bangladesh. In the population 
of around 40 million people, as many as 400 distinct tribal and subtribal groups have 
been identified, and a large proportion of the population trace their linguistic heritage 
to the Mon-Khmer and Tibeto-Burman subfamilies of the larger Indo-Chinese linguis-
tic group (Das, 1989). These groups are categorized as Scheduled Tribes in India, and 
make up the majority of the population in five out of eight of the federal states in the 
region, and large minority populations in the other three states. The region has been 
characterized by insurgency and counterinsurgency for most of the period following 
Indian Independence in 1947.
Although India contains diverse regions and a coherent national society is not always 
identifiable, there is a distance between the Northeast and the rest of India that is quali-
tatively different from that between other regions in India. Although regions and people 
throughout India are constructed and viewed differently to each other, and these differ-
ences are pronounced and often articulated forcefully at the local level, they still fit into 
the larger nation, though rarely without difficulties, in ways that the Northeast does not. 
There is a strong belief in both the Indian “mainland” and in most of the Northeast itself 
that the different states, autonomous units, and people grouped together as “the Northeast” 
are not part of India in the same ways as other diverse groups of people. Although this 
separation is necessary to emphasize the sense of cultural, social, and political alien-
ation between the Northeast and the mainland, it can understate the degree of connectiv-
ity between the two. People from the region interact with the mainland in many ways. 
The national state is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of many of the 
institutions through which people’s lives are determined, such as the state government 
and departments, the Sixth Schedule, and the military. Many of the region’s people 
interact with the state, and in many cases identify with it through holding Indian citizen-
ship, government employment, the national education system, and social and political 
networks between the Northeast and the rest of India. Despite these links, the separation 
is pronounced.
Tribal women in the Northeast are perceived to be living under distinct gender relation-
ships and are perceived as being “better off” than women in other parts of India (Barbora & 
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Fernandes, 2002). Women in the Northeast are seen as more empowered, engaged in more 
egalitarian social and legal relationships with men, and less constrained by the patriarchal 
forms of power that dominate the rest of India. These perceptions are propagated by the 
existence of a comparatively more egalitarian gendered division of labor (Krishna, 1996), 
adherence to Christianity, indigenous faiths and less rigid forms of Hinduism (Bhaumik, 
2004; Singh, 2004; Zote, 2006), visible participation in “male domains” such as sport 
(Mills, 2006), and by racial stereotypes about tribal women being less bound by conserva-
tive traditions and more sexually promiscuous (Baruah, 2006; Kikon, 2009b). Beneath 
these perceptions are strong patriarchal relations, though these are formed through differ-
ent traditions than those in other parts of India. This will be discussed below.
Women in the Northeast rank highly on a number of indicators that are seen in the 
VAW literature to lower the risks of violence. Illiteracy for women in India is 58.2%; all 
female illiteracy rates in the Northeast are below this, and in the hill states female literacy 
rates are among the highest in India (MHFW, 2002). In Mizoram, the literacy rate for 
women aged 15 to 49 is 94.0% and is higher than that of men (MHFW et al., 2009). 
Women in all Northeast states get married later than women elsewhere in India (MHFW, 
2002). Indicators for employment for women are also well above the national average in 
the hill states, though the proportion of these women who are paid cash for their work in 
lower than the national average in these same states, suggesting much of this work is 
agricultural labor on family plots (MHFW, 2009), but the overall proportion of women in 
paid employment is higher than the rest of India. In all states in the Northeast except 
Tripura, the percentage of women participating in household decision making3 is far 
above the national average, and it is almost double the national average in Manipur, 
Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland (MHFW, 2009). The majority of families in the hill 
states are nuclear, which is in contrast to other parts of India where joint families are seen 
as “fertile ground” for VAW, especially dowry-related VAW (Panchanadeswaran & 
Koverola, 2005, p. 744). Throughout the Northeast, the sex preference ratio is more bal-
anced than the national average; in other words, preference for more male children than 
female children is lower and preference for more female than male children is higher 
(MHFW, 2002). There is a range of other statistics that could be cited here to make the 
same point, namely, the overall trend across a range of different indictors demonstrates 
that women in the Northeast live in a very different gendered context than women in other 
parts of India. Thus, consideration of gender needs to go beyond national level analysis in 
understanding situated intersections.
Despite containing few of the characteristics that make up the national culture of 
violence in India, and despite having some of the best gender indicators in India, VAW 
in the Northeast is widespread. Recognizing that statistics on VAW are likely to be vast 
underestimates they do provide helpful comparisons with other parts of India. Again, 
using the last two National Family and Health Survey’s the following statistics are strik-
ing. In the 2002 National Family and Health Survey, which, as noted above, not only 
limited results to domestic violence but also included experiences of violence beyond the 
household, the percentages of women in the Northeast experiencing VAW were above 
the national average or marginally below. Compared with the national average of 21.0%, 
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31.1% of women in Meghalaya experienced VAW, which was second highest rate in all 
of India (MHFW, 2002). The levels recorded in the other hill states were 26.4% in 
Arunachal Pradesh, 19.7% in Manipur, 20.1% in Mizoram, and 19.0% in Nagaland 
(MHFW, 2002). What is even more striking is that the survey also recorded the perpetra-
tors of the violence. In Meghalaya, almost 9 out of 10 women experiencing VAW were 
victimized outside the family. In Mizoram, it was 5 in 10, and in Arunachal Pradesh and 
Nagaland the ratio was 4 in 10 (MHFW, 2002). The ratio was also above the national 
average in Manipur and Sikkim. This is dramatically different from the rest of India 
where 89.5% of VAW is perpetrated by husbands, which increases to 98% if in-laws and 
other family members are included (MHFW, 2002).
It is important to note that in the 2009 survey the definition of violence was expanded 
to include emotional, sexual, and physical violence, but the focus was on violence by 
spouses and household members. In this survey, levels of physical violence and correlated 
physical, sexual, and emotional violence in the Northeast states were lower and much 
closer to the national average of 37.5% and 39.7%, respectively. The difference is spec-
tacular in certain cases. Meghalaya went from having the second highest rates of VAW in 
India in 2002 to tying for second lowest in 2009 (MHFW et al., 2009). The other hill states 
were also below the national average (with the exception of Arunachal Pradesh) after 
being above in 2002 (MHFW et al., 2009). Thus, while not to deny the very real and 
severe frequency of spousal and familial violence in the Northeast states, the context in 
which VAW is occurring is significantly different from the context in other parts of India. 
VAW is being experienced with more, or comparable, frequency outside the family. This 
will be examined in the following section.
The Frontier Culture of Violence
VAW in the Northeast takes place in a frontier culture of violence. This term designates 
a culture of violence that is considerably different from the national culture discussed in 
the VAW literature and locates this culture in the specific political, social, and economic 
circumstances of the Northeast frontier. Within the frontier culture of violence are two 
spatial contexts: the external nonfamilial context, where VAW is perpetrated outside the 
household, and the internal familial context that focuses on VAW in the household. These 
contexts are separated analytically, but in reality the distinction is blurred.
In the Northeast, the proportion of VAW perpetrated by persons outside the house-
hold is the highest in India and multiple times higher than the national average. The 
most crucial component of this is the wholesale militarization of the region. Militarization 
comes from the Indian Armed Forces and paramilitary groups (hereafter, armed forces) 
and local militant groups primarily organized along ethnic lines. The presence of large 
numbers of armed men directly causes VAW as scores of cases of murder, rape, molesta-
tion, and sexual harassment by members of the armed forces and militant groups attest. 
This presence indirectly causes VAW by propagating a frontier culture where violence 
is routine, frequently witnessed, and normalized. In this culture, VAW in public and in 
the household is widespread and the distinction between the two is continually 
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collapsed. This frontier culture of violence is not the sole determinant of VAW in the 
Northeast, yet it structures a subnational context that is pervasive and has deepened 
over five decades. The armed forces and a number of paramilitary forces are present 
throughout the Northeast. While present in parts of the region during the colonial era, 
large deployments of armed forces personnel for counterinsurgency operations in the 
period after Indian Independence in 1947 and following the Sino-Indian War of 1962 
have steadily increased their numbers. In recent decades, the armed forces have come to 
symbolize an occupying force for the people of the region. Armed personal are encoun-
tered on the roads, in towns, in villages, and in markets. Military cantonments and bases 
occupy town centers, strategic hills, bridges, and border crossings. Members of the 
armed forces frequently stop vehicles to search passengers and cargo. Checkpoints are 
numerous, heavily curtailing movement.
Members of the armed forces deployed in the region are protected by the Armed 
Forces Special Powers Act 1958 (AFPSA). The AFSPA allows “any commissioned offi-
cer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer or any other person of equivalent rank in 
the armed forces” to fire “even to the causing of death” on any person acting in contra-
vention of any law or order, any person carrying weapons or anything capable of being 
used as a weapon, and to prohibit the assembly of more than five people (Ministry of 
Home Affairs [MHA], 1958/1998, p. S4a). It allows armed forces personnel to arrest 
without warrant and with any necessary force “any person who has committed a cogni-
zable offence or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists that he [sic] has committed 
or is about to commit a cognizable offence” (MHA, 1958/1998, p. S4c). It allows armed 
forces personnel to enter and search any premises without a warrant to “make any such 
arrest” (MHA, 1958/1998, p. S4d). The most significant part is Section 6, which states,
No prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the 
previous sanction of the Central Government, against any person in respect of 
anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this 
Act. (MHA, 1958/1998, p. S6)
Over the last 50 years, the AFSPA has been applied to any area declared “disturbed” 
by the Indian Government. Designating an area “disturbed” must be reviewed every 6 months, 
yet there is no limit on the number of times this designation can be renewed, effectively 
meaning some areas can, and have been, classified as “disturbed” for decades. The desig-
nation “disturbed” is not open to judicial review, nor can it be contested by state govern-
ments (South Asian Human Rights Documentation Centre [SAHRDC], 1995), let alone 
local governments in the said area or concerned civil society actors. As of 2009 the only 
states with no “disturbed areas” are Sikkim, only recently included and administered as 
part of Northeast India, and Mizoram.4
Murder, rape, beatings, and sexual harassment by the armed forces in the Northeast 
have been well documented in a number of international and national human rights reports 
(Asian Centre for Human Rights [ACHR], 2008a, 2008b; Human Rights Watch [HRW], 
2008), and by women’s organizations, activists, and human rights groups in the region 
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itself. The bulk of this material highlights individual cases rather than an overall data set. 
Rape by armed forces personnel has been widely documented and this includes rape after 
forced entry into homes, rape at gunpoint, rape of women in captivity arrested on suspicion 
of links with insurgents, rape of school-aged girls on their way to or from school, and the 
abduction and subsequent rape of women and girls from their homes, including gang rape. 
In many cases, women have been raped in front of family members, including children, 
who were held at gunpoint by other members of the armed forces. In other cases, victims 
of rape have died after sustaining injuries during attacks. Physical violence also occurs, 
particularly when women intervene when armed forces personnel attack family members 
or friends (compiled from ACHR, 2008a, 2008b; Goswami, Sreekala, & Goswami, 2005; 
HRW, 2008; Hussain, 2006).
Women’s bodies have become the territory on which this culture of violence is marked. 
In their study of women in armed violence in the Northeast, Goswami et al. (2005) argue 
that it is “the perceived honor of the enemy that is the target in sexually violating their 
women” (p. 37). In a clear example of this, in one of the cases related in their study, a 
woman was raped by two armed forces personnel in the kitchen of her home while the rest 
of the village were assembled under gunpoint outside in an alleged search for insurgents. 
After raping the woman, one of the armed forces personnel threw a 10 rupee (20 US cents) 
note at her (p. 40). Race and gender intersect in harassment and violence directed toward 
tribal women, particularly by nontribal members of the armed forces. Thus, tribal women 
are not just “women of the enemy,” but also perceived to be less bound by moral codes 
that apply to women in other parts of India. Rape followed by a humiliating offer of pay-
ment exemplifies this highly racialized aspect of VAW in the region. It is here that the 
relational aspects of race and ethnicity that are crucial to intersectionality can be seen. The 
sexuality and morality of Northeast women is drawn from their ethnic differentiation from 
the Indian mainstream and their membership in a suspect and exceptional population.
Crucial to all of these incidents is the fact that the perpetrators are protected under the 
AFSPA. The AFSPA provides de jure impunity in that members of the armed forces are 
not prosecuted in civilian courts, and under the provisions of the act VAW is not deemed 
criminal. As HRW (2008) reports, the AFSPA also provides a form of de facto impunity 
as military courts responsible for prosecuting soldiers have often failed to investigate 
violations or been “simply unwilling” to bring charges against military personnel (p. 18). 
In certain cases, the armed forces have lodged counterclaims against women accusing 
them of trying to defame the army (Goswami et al., 2005). Despite a 1997 amendment to 
the AFSPA that any person arrested under the act must be handed over to civilian authori-
ties within 24 hr, this is frequently ignored (ACHR, 2008b). Persons arrested have been 
detained for periods ranging from 1 week to several months. These periods of detention 
have facilitated torture, rape, and murder by the armed forces, including rape and torture 
of children (ACHR, 2008b).
The persistence of the AFSPA epitomizes the tacit acceptance of systematic violence 
as a necessary by-product of securing an unruly border region and policing a suspect 
population (Kikon, 2009a). The region is constructed externally and internally as an 
exception to norms and laws upheld in other parts of India (McDuie-Ra, 2009b). Military 
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occupation, the creation of federal states, centrally directed development and resource 
extraction, the provision for reservations for people in the region to study and work in 
other parts of India, are all part of the ongoing process of making a legible state in the 
Northeast, creating a permanent state of exception. Far from assuring legibility, the mili-
tarization of the region has fragmented state making to severe degrees of disorder (see 
Hansen & Stepputat, 2001).
Furthermore, VAW is perpetrated not only by the “occupying” armed forces but also by 
the local law enforcement agencies. While this also takes place in other parts of India and 
the world, in the frontier culture of violence VAW by law enforcement agencies is more pos-
sible and less extraordinary when it occurs. This is not restricted to “disturbed” areas. The 
states of the Northeast have very high ratios of police per capita. Compared to a national 
average of 1,360 police per 1 million persons, all states in the Northeast have much higher 
ratios. In some Northeast states, the ratios are multiple times higher: Nagaland has 9,500 
police per 1 million persons; Mizoram, 7,250; Sikkim, 6,230; Manipur, 5,930 (Government 
of India [GoI], 2002). The proximity to international borders means additional security per-
sonnel are constantly on the move throughout the region. Despite being bound by different 
laws from the AFSPA, law enforcement agencies operate in the culture of impunity created 
by the AFSPA and a militarized society. As Chenoy (2002) argues, in this environment “the 
very sight of men in uniform is traumatizing” (p. 133).
The frontier culture of violence is not simply a product of the armed forces and the 
AFSPA; it is enhanced and reproduced by ethno-nationalist militant groups. Given the 
ethnic diversity of the Northeast, the small populations of many of the region’s ethnic 
groups when compared to other groups in India, and the historical and contemporary strug-
gles required to achieve rights and political autonomy, it is unsurprising that ethno-nationalism 
is salient and shapes the ways people in the region view the rest of India, migrants to the 
Northeast, and other tribal groups living in the region (Baruah, 2006). Ethno-nationalism 
is not always manifested in insurgency and violence. It has also underpinned powerful 
social movements that have made vital gains for ethnic minority cultural rights, land rights, 
and social justice. Similarly, armed violence has not always been carried out in the pursuit 
of ethno-nationalist ends; extortion, smuggling, trafficking, control of natural resources, 
and political power have all taken on armed dimensions in the region (Dai, 2007; Das, 
2007; Lacina, 2007). Importantly, militant groups do not always receive widespread popu-
lar support from the communities they claim to represent. Again, this is not uniform; in 
some parts of the region militant groups enjoy deep community support and legitimacy, 
while in others they are viewed as an antisocial element involved in organized crime and 
extortion. Regardless of motivations and support the number of armed militant groups has 
increased dramatically over the last 50 years to between 100 and 120 (Baruah, 2005).
Militant groups also perpetrate VAW, particularly in internecine violence. Cases that 
have been documented include those of women experiencing violence by militants from 
rival communities and from their own communities (Hussain, 2006). Particularly vulnera-
ble are women and children in internally displaced persons’ camps, which are spread 
throughout the Northeast (Das, 2008a). In this environment women’s experiences of VAW 
go beyond incidents of violence to which they are personally subjected. Goswami et al. 
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(2005) identify six “categories” of women affected: women relatives of armed activists, 
women relatives of state armed forces, women militants or combatants, women as shelter 
providers, women as victims of sexual and physical abuse, woman as peace negotiators, 
women as rights activists (p. 19). It is also conceivable that many women fulfill multiple 
categories in their varied roles inside and outside the household.
In understanding the prevalence of VAW in the Northeast it is important not to over-
determine the role of the armed forces and militant groups. Although militarized, every-
day life in the Northeast is not constantly violent. The internal familial context is also 
important. The unwavering perception of women’s elevated position in the Northeast, a 
perception common both within and outside the region, hides heterogeneous forms of 
patriarchy. Patriarchy is evolving as customary practices are reshaped by modern legal 
and social norms, yet subordination remains widespread. Despite the involvement of 
women in agricultural production, paid employment, and household decision making, 
women are still excluded from formal decision making institutions (Barbora & Fernandes, 
2002).5 In other parts of India, village- and district-level institutions have one third of the 
seats reserved for women under the 73rd Amendment to the Indian Constitution. The 
extension of this to the Northeast states has been staunchly resisted on the ground that it 
is against tradition (Krishna, 2004; McDuie-Ra, 2007; Nongbri, 2003). Exclusion 
extends to state-level “modern” politics, where the number of women representatives in 
the Northeast states is the lowest in India (United Nation Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2001). In many parts of the Northeast, patriarchy 
is growing stronger as societies undergo rapid social and economic change (Barbora & 
Fernandes, 2002; Kikon, 2002; Nongbri, 2008; Zehol, 1998). The point to note is that the 
foundations and structures of patriarchy are fundamentally different from the metacul-
tural patriarchy discussed in the VAW literature, yet despite the perceptions of elevated 
status for women, patriarchy is a reality of the internal familial context in the region.
In this frontier culture of violence VAW emanates from the continued interplay between 
the external nonfamilial context and the internal familial context. In this environment, vio-
lence is constitutive of public and private spaces. Pandey (2006) refers to this as “routine 
violence” (p. 8), that is, violence not merely in its spectacular forms but also in its disguised 
forms, normalized and widespread. As Goswami et al. (2005) argue, in a militarized society, 
even in locations where actual armed violence is minimal, VAW is far higher than in non-
militarized societies. Gill (2006) refers to this as “violence on three fronts,” namely, vio-
lence experienced by women from the state, from militants, and “a corresponding escalation 
of violence in their homes” (p. 215).
Beyond the direct physical and sexual violence experienced in the Northeast, the psy-
chological aspects of violence are an important part of this interplay. Murder, rape, and 
torture by the armed forces and by militant groups impute a deep sense of fear and insecu-
rity in everyday life. This shapes the choices women make about their own mobility and 
those of their family members, and the choices family members impose on women, which 
has lasting consequences when mobility is necessary for health care, employment, liveli-
hoods, and education (Gill, 2006), and to escape abuse. Mobility usually always requires 
interactions with armed personnel, perpetuating the fear that each search, each routine 
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questioning, each suspicion could escalate into violence or detention, and under the protec-
tion of the AFSPA there is no way to prevent this happening or to seek justice when it does. 
Fear of the armed forces, and also militants, is not restricted to women’s interactions in 
public. The AFSPA enables the search of any premises without a warrant. For many 
women, the household provides no shelter from violence and intimidation.
The frontier culture of violence also affects men, particularly young men from the hill 
states and other hill areas. Young men are racially profiled as insurgents by the military and 
are the targets of recruitment by insurgents. They are subject to pressures and harassment 
from both sides. Movement, employment, education, and social networks are all jeopar-
dized in this environment. Young men who move in groups attract high levels of suspicion 
and harassment, yet young men who move around on their own are far more vulnerable to 
harassment and without a companion it can be difficult to trace individuals when disappear-
ances occur. The psychological impact militarization has on young men is rarely examined 
beyond being a catalyst to join militant groups or the armed forces. Attention is mostly given 
to combatants, with little attention given to the impacts of militarization on noncombatants, 
particularly the long-term psychological impacts of living in this environment—impacts 
that get taken home daily. There is little consideration of the nature of masculinity in this 
environment. Rehabilitation of former militants is almost entirely focused on vocational 
training and cash incentives, with no resources or consideration of psychological support 
(Farrelly, 2009). Thus, women exist in an environment dominated by the nationalist-infused 
masculinity of the occupying military, the ethno-nationalist masculinity of insurgency and 
gun culture, and the obligatory masculinity of tribal men more broadly who frequently claim 
women as property of the ethnic group in the broader ethno-nationalist struggle.
Data that demonstrate the interplay between external nonfamilial contexts and internal 
familial contexts are scarce and difficult to generate given the personal and psychological 
nature of the interplay. Beyond the VAW statistics discussed in the previous section there 
are few ways to draw clear-cut links between the “three fronts” of VAW. However, there 
are attitudinal statistics that offer some guidance. As Flood and Pease (2009) have found, 
such attitudes shape the perpetration of VAW and the responses of women experiencing 
VAW as well as those around them. Studies from other parts of India have emphasized the 
links between witnessing VAW in childhood and perpetrating and accepting VAW in adult 
life (Martin et al., 2002; Panda & Agarwal, 2005). These studies have been made in the 
context of familial violence, yet in the context of the Northeast the principle could be 
extended to the interplay between nonfamilial and familial contexts. In the Northeast 
violence is experienced in such a routine manner that its impact on perceptions of VAW 
should not be underestimated.
The 2009 National Family and Health Survey provides details about attitudes of both 
men and women toward VAW. Men and women were asked whether they agreed with any 
of the following reasons as justification for a husband beating his wife:
she goes out without telling him, she neglects the house or children, she argues 
with him, she refuses to have sexual intercourse with him, she doesn’t cook food 
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properly, he suspects she is unfaithful, and she shows disrespect for in-laws. 
(MHFW, 2009, p. 474)
The percentage who agreed with at least one of the reasons is very high in the 
Northeast, particularly among women and men in Manipur (89.7% of women and 85% 
of men), Mizoram (83.0% of women and 82.6% of men), and Nagaland (78.9% of 
women and 71.2% of men). It is unlikely to be merely coincidental that these states have 
faced the worst excesses of militarization over the last five decades. In all the other hill 
states the percentage agreeing with at least one of the justifications for wife beating is 
well above the national average of 54.4% of women and 51.0% of men (MHFW, 2009). 
This is not to suggest that such attitudes are wholly shaped by militarism. That is to say, 
it is not as if prior to the occupation by the armed forces and the growth in militancy all 
of the ethnic groups in the region had vastly different attitudes toward gender relations 
that have now been brutalized, tempting as such a reading may be. Yet it would also be 
difficult to argue that there is no link between militarization, high levels of VAW, and 
individual acceptance of VAW. Given the enormous differential to the national average, 
the normalization of violence means that a degree of interplay cannot be dismissed or 
overlooked. In an environment where violence is routine, the nonfamilial and familial 
causes of VAW are mutually constitutive and threaded into what Nordstrom (2004) calls 
“the fabric of everyday life” (p. 68). It is in this social environment that women’s move-
ments have contested the causes of VAW, the focus of the following section.
Contesting VAW in the Frontier
Moser and Clark (2001) argue that women are not simply caught in the middle of oppos-
ing armed factions in militarized societies but are also agents in these same environ-
ments. As Kandiyoti (1988) has famously argued, women strategize and bargain with 
patriarchy “within a set of concrete constraints” (p. 275). Ray (1999) has taken this 
further, introducing the concept of a “field,” defined as “a structured, unequal, and 
socially constructed environment within which organizations are embedded and to 
which organizations and activists constantly respond” (p. 6). In the Northeast, the fields 
within which women’s organizations and activists are embedded include the frontier 
culture of violence and different localized tribal and ethnic cultures beneath, each with 
their own gendered norms.
Collective agency contesting VAW has been undertaken by a range of diverse organiza-
tions and activists, termed movements here to denote both the ongoing role played by 
established organizations and the collaborative networks that form during periods of 
intense contestation, and “organizations” when specific actors are being discussed. Women’s 
movements in the Northeast have contested both the external nonfamilial context of VAW 
and the internal familial context of VAW. In most cases they have been more successful in 
contesting the external context, particularly VAW carried out by the armed forces, and less 
successful in contesting internal causes, particularly when this involves speaking out 
against a designated tribal or ethnic community.
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In contesting VAW perpetrated by the armed forces and the protection afforded by the 
AFSPA, women’s movements have been able to bring VAW in the Northeast onto regional 
and national political agendas. Contesting the AFSPA has widespread support from other 
civil society actors in the Northeast and from a public weary of violence, particularly in 
the states experiencing the worst excesses of the armed forces (Bannerjee, 2008a). This 
has been most evident in Manipur, where the women’s movement has campaigned against 
the AFSPA for over 30 years, led by the Meira Paibis (torch-bearing women). The Meira 
Paibis have held nightlong vigils in the state capital, Imphal, whenever there is a rape, 
murder, or disappearance at the hands of the armed forces (Devi, 1998; Veda, 2005). They 
were instrumental in bringing VAW by the armed forces to national attention after 40 of 
their members, mostly middle-aged women, protested naked in front of the Kangla Fort 
where the Assam Rifles paramilitary force was stationed in July 2004 after the rape and 
murder of a 32-year-old Manipuri woman, Thangjam Manorama (hereafter Manorama; 
Gaikwad, 2009; McDuie-Ra, 2005; Vajpeyi, 2009). A few days before the protest a group 
of armed forces personnel entered Manorama’s house in the state capital, Imphal, and 
arrested her on the premise that she was an explosives expert with the People’s Liberation 
Army, the oldest insurgent group in Manipur. They beat her outside the house for 3 hr 
while the rest of the family was locked inside the house and then took her away. The fol-
lowing afternoon her body was found naked and bullet-ridden by a roadside. It was diffi-
cult for doctors to determine whether she had been raped given the number of bullets in 
her body. As Gaikwad (2009) writes, “her death bore testimony of the most visceral kind, 
to the unwavering brutality of the security forces” (p. 304). The case of Manorama was 
the catalyst for massive protests against the armed forces, including the much publicized 
naked protest. The women who entered the army barracks held up banners that read 
“Indian Army Rape Us” and “Indian Army Take Our Flesh” (Gaikwad, 2009, p. 306; 
McDuie-Ra, 2005, p. 57; Vajpeyi, 2009, p. 27). The protests brought national attention to 
abuses by the armed forces in Manipur and it was a catalyst for other civil society actors 
to pressure the state and central governments to remove the AFSPA, culminating in the 
establishment of the high-level Reddy Commission to review the AFSPA and the with-
drawal of armed forces from the Kangla Fort in Imphal (Chasie & Hazarika, 2009).
While the women’s movement in Manipur is diverse it has become most well known 
for its role in protesting against the AFSPA. This has meant that the external and internal 
causes of VAW have become channeled into a singular target, the armed forces. At the 
local level, patriarchy is firmly intact, militant groups continue to fracture society, and 
women are excluded from most forms of local political participation (Veda, 2005). VAW 
is high and attitudes toward VAW in Manipur demonstrate that the success in opposing the 
armed forces has not translated into a major shift in patriarchal attitudes within the local 
“field.” As Brara (2002) argues, the women’s movement in Manipur is “of” the women 
but not “for” the women (p. 195). If the AFSPA is eventually repealed it will be difficult 
for the women’s movement to disaggregate VAW from the broader struggle against the 
armed forces. Being an instrumental part of a larger movement against the AFSPA may 
have provided opportunities for the women’s movement to contest and expose VAW, yet 
it also places limits on the ways VAW is contested.
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Furthermore, ethnic divisions have been replicated in the women’s movement in 
Manipur. Tensions and violence between Meteis of the Imphal valley, Naga communities 
in the hills to the north and Kuki communities to the south have fragmented Manipuri 
society (Parratt & Parratt, 2003). Naga women’s groups working in the hill areas against 
VAW have few avenues of communication with groups in other parts of Manipur or other 
parts of India due to their remote location and tensions between Meitei and Naga commu-
nities impairing cooperation (Bannerjee, 2008a; Goswami et al., 2005). Kuki women’s 
groups have been restricted to hill areas in the south of the state where lack of infrastructure 
and the high number of militant groups have reduced their ability to network with other 
women’s groups (Veda, 2005).
This demonstrates the bind for women’s movements in the Northeast. They are contest-
ing VAW on what Gaikwad (2009) refers to as “unstable ground,” where it becomes difficult 
to pinpoint the “wrongdoers” (p. 300). While contestation of VAW by the armed forces has 
been successful, there are also instances of women’s movements contesting militant groups 
from their own communities. Organizations such as the Bodo Women’s Justice Forum, the 
Naga Women’s Association, and the Naga Women’s Union of Manipur have spoken out 
against shootings, campaigned for peace at the local level, and also participated in peace 
negotiations between different armed factions and with the government (Bannerjee, 2008a, 
2008b; Das, 2008b; Chenoy, 2002; Gill, 2006). Participation has been successful in giving 
women a voice, yet it has also drawn women’s organizations deeper into ethnic politics. 
Women’s organizations have been co-opted into ethnic politics in some local circumstances, 
but they have chosen to participate in ethnic politics in others, and in some contexts they 
have challenged VAW from an autonomous position. In targeting the armed forces and mili-
tant groups, women’s movements have framed VAW as part of a larger social ill, something 
attached to the fragmentation of society. VAW is cast in the shadow of militarization, a 
product of the external nonfamilial context rather than the internal familial context.
VAW within the internal familial context is much more difficult to contest. The case of 
women’s organizations in the state of Meghalaya demonstrates this. Women’s organiza-
tions in Meghalaya have contested the causes of VAW from within Garo and Khasi society, 
the two main tribal groups in the state. Women’s organizations have consciously framed 
VAW as something caused by members of the tribal community. Rallies against VAW in 
2003 and 2004 brought women (and men) from different ethnic communities together and 
called on the society to take responsibility for VAW (McDuie-Ra, 2007). In this period 
women’s organizations made demands on the state government to set up a state-level wom-
en’s commission to report to the National Commission for Women. Such state-level com-
missions existed in others parts of India but had not yet been established in Meghalaya. 
After a yearlong delay a commission was created on the eve of a visit by the National 
Women’s Commission and was stacked with hand-picked appointees by the state govern-
ment. Members of the women’s movement that had protested vocally against VAW were 
excluded and the commission was later made a government department leaving it wholly 
de-politicized and completely co-opted (McDuie-Ra, 2009a).
The movement in Meghalaya faced two considerable constraints particular to the 
Northeast. First, contesting familial causes of VAW is a sensitive exercise as it exposes 
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gender relations within the different ethnic groups of the Northeast and subjects traditions 
to critical scrutiny (Kikon, 2002; Krishna, 2004; Nongbri, 2003). This occurs in a context 
where ethnic identity is heightened by ethno-nationalism, and traditions of ethnic and tribal 
groups are celebrated and defended, not criticized and altered. Furthermore, contesting 
internal familial causes of VAW is difficult in the face of the myth of the empowered tribal 
woman. This makes it very difficult for women’s organizations to identify and frame the 
patriarchal relationships they are contesting. This not only distorts gender relationships at 
the local level but further isolates women’s organizations and activists from networks in 
other parts of India. This is even more difficult for women’s organizations from matrilineal 
ethnic groups, as is the case with the Garo and Khasi, as the perception of female domina-
tion makes patriarchy hard to critique (Nongbri, 2008).
Second, state intrusion distorts the contestation of VAW. Under the AFSPA, assembly 
of more than five people in disturbed areas is banned. This makes protests, rallies, and 
civic participation very difficult. The state monitors civil society closely, perpetually on 
the lookout for links with insurgents. Even in areas not declared disturbed, any association 
or suspected association with insurgent groups can mean blacklisting or banning, and 
organizations must comply with arduous registration requirements to remain legitimate in 
the eyes of the state and continue to receive funds from donors or other supporters 
(McDuie-Ra, 2006). For women’s movements, this has resulted in cooption into govern-
ment departments on one hand and so-called NGO-ization on the other (Alvarez, 2009). 
While this has enabled input into social policy in many parts of the region, it has provided 
few opportunities to contest either external or internal contexts of VAW. As political 
power lies within traditional governance institutions and ethno-nationalist actors rather 
than the NGO sector or government departments, women’s organizations must contend 
with being legitimate but marginalized in largely de-politicized spaces. This leaves wom-
en’s organizations on delicate ground. They are both dependent on the state to address 
VAW, but clearly at risk of cooption in these engagements. They are members of the same 
communities that are pursuing ethno-nationalist struggles, while simultaneously having 
their political capital coveted by these same organizations, giving few possibilities to 
contest VAW within their own communities.
Conclusion
National cultures of violence underpinned by a homogeneous patriarchy may make 
global comparisons of VAW easier, but they are of limited use in explaining VAW in 
subnational contexts where the national culture has little purchase. Few of the explana-
tions of VAW in other parts of India apply in the Northeast, and many of the factors 
believed to reduce the risks of VAW are present and prevalent. Yet VAW is widespread. 
In the Northeast, the frontier culture of violence has far more impact on the ways VAW 
is perpetrated, experienced, and contested as it structures the environment in which 
women and men carry out their everyday lives. Violence is witnessed in the home and 
outside it—in the streets, on the roadsides, in the markets, in the barracks, in the fields, 
and in the trees. Accordingly, VAW is experienced in the home and outside it, collapsing 
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distinctions between public and private spheres that cordon off household violence from 
societal violence. Race and gender intersect in the tense relationship between occupying 
forces and tribal women, between rival ethnic and tribal communities, and in determining 
which perpetrators of VAW are acceptable to challenge. In looking beyond national 
frames of reference in analyzing VAW, it is crucial to adopt an intersectional approach to 
deeply analyze regional spaces, which in the case of the Northeast have constructed the 
legal, political, and cultural grounds on which VAW occurs and limits the extent to which 
it is addressed. Although the Northeast is unique in the Indian context, it has similarities 
to other frontier areas and borderlands throughout the world, where militarization and 
marginality coexist in a permanently fragile milieu.
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Notes
1. Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland.
2. North India minus the Northeast.
3. Surveyed through four categories of decision making: decisions about own health care, major 
purchases, household purchases, and visits to family and friends (MHFW, 2009, p. 467).
4. Mizoram was a “disturbed” area for 19 years before peace accords with the Indian govern-
ment in 1986.
5. Scheduled Tribes are under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, which legislates 
for “traditional” village governance and amalgamated apex bodies at the district level. Par-
liamentary state legislates also operate in tandem in each state.
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